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2.1. Introduction
The Europe 2020 Strategy (EU2020S) was launched by the European 
Commission (EC) in november 2009 and discussed in the first semester of 2010 
by different European Union (EU) institutions (the Parliament, the Council, 
etc.), with a first overall discussion held in the European Council meeting on 
the 25th-26th March 2010 in Brussels. The consolidated official document of 
the EU2020S constitutes a Communication from the Commission published 
in March 2010 (European Commission, 2010a), being finally adopted by the 
European Council on the 17th of June 2010 in a meeting held in Brussels. 
The presidency of the Union at the time of the first semester in 2010 wished 
the EU2020S to be binding for member states,1 an intention that was never to 
materialise. Thus, the EU2020S is a document of a strategic nature, that is to 
say, it is neither normative nor binding. 
At this point, it must be stressed what a document of a non-binding strate-
gic nature implies, fundamentally, it is considered to be a guiding framework 
for action but not a normative plan in the normal sense of planning (Zoido 
et al., 2000). Accordingly, the following definition of strategic planning is 
relevant to the EU2020S: “the effort made in generating those decisions and 
actions which are considered to be fundamental in making the desired vision 
of the future a reality […] through involvement in objectives and measures to 
achieve them, with well established priorities” (Farinós et al., 2005: 119; in 
italics in the original). As in all strategies, the idea of vision is fundamental: 
while conventional planning “merely brings the expectative into line with the 
tendencies derived from the existing model (scenario approach)”, the strategy 
consists of “change depending on the required goals (visions)” (Farinós et al., 
2005: 120).
1  Isenson, n. (2010). Spain calls for binding EU economic goals - and penalties. Deutsche Welle 8.1.2010. 
<http://www.dw.de/spain-calls-for-binding-eu-economic-goals-and-penalties/a-5098907-1> (Accessed 
13.1.2013).
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The EU2020S has as meaningful subtitle “a strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth”. That is to say, the EU2020S, first and foremost, seeks 
growth and considers that this prime objective must be achieved through three 
priorities, also known as pillars, which, as the terms used in the subheading 
states, go beyond the strictly economic sense and embraces social and envi-
ronmental questions. The document contains a preface of the President of the 
EC saying that the context of “economic and financial crisis” has motivated 
the elaboration of this EU2020S for achieving “a sustainable future”, which 
is “about more jobs and better lives”, acknowledging that the EU “has the 
capability to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, to find the path 
to create more jobs and to offer a sense of direction to our societies” (European 
Commission, 2010a: 2); this constitutes the basic rationale of the EU2020S. 
If the strategic document of the EU for the decade 2000-2010 was the so-
called Lisbon Strategy (also known as the Lisbon Agenda or Lisbon Process), 
the intended strategic document for the decade 2010-2020 is the EU2020S. 
Mainly, the need of a new strategic direction of the EU is motivated by the 
crisis context. In accordance with the EU2020S itself, the global circumstance 
since 20082 “has wiped out years of economic and social progress and exposed 
structural weaknesses in Europe’s economy” (European Commission, 2010a: 
4). Importantly, there is ample agreement that the objectives set by the Lis-
bon Strategy have been unfulfilled (for instance, Moltó, 2012 or Lundvall and 
Lorenz, 2011). This generalised opinion can even be found in official docu-
ments, for example in the ad hoc assessment of the European Commission it-
self (2010b) or in a book sponsored by the European Union on the application 
of the Lisbon Strategy and the EU2020S in Croatia — in which it can be read 
“the results were weaker than expected” (Butković and Samardžija, 2010: 
6). Also, in terms of the research generated by ESPOn with the conclusion 
reached being that the objectives set during the Lisbon decade have not been 
achieved in much of the Union: “Some countries have reached the targets for 
some indicators, but most countries still have some way to go” (Bundesamt 
für Bauwesen und Raumordnung, 2006: 24).
2.2. General Structure of the EU2020S
The EU2020S consists of a double-folder of thematic organisation (Graphic 
1.1): on the one hand, three priorities are launched; on the other, seven flag-
2  In accordance with Kotz (2009: 1), the year the global crisis started in the United States cannot be pre-
cise, but the majority of the European countries certainly saw themselves involved between 2007 and 2009. 
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ships are established. In relation to the priorities (also quoted as pillars), they 
can be defined as the basic aims that are attempted to be attained by means of 
the EU2020S, in an inter-related manner, as follows:
- Smart Growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and in-
novation.
- Sustainable Growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and 
more competitive economy.
- Inclusive Growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering 
social and territorial cohesion.
These three themes are understood to be the very basic framework of the 
EU2020S. As is easily deducible, its denomination is very reminiscent of the 
classic model of sustainability distributed in three large blocks (economic, 
environmental and social), popularised since the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit 
in 1992 and which is frequently represented by a Venn diagram. Thereby, the 
EU2020S apparently embraces the major issues that are globally considered 
to warrant attention through the paradigm of sustainability (Blewitt, 2008). 
Furthermore, it can be said that the EU2020S goes thematically beyond the 
previous Lisbon Strategy, as the latter was basically focused on economic and 
smart growth (competitiveness and knowledge-based economy) and included 
several social issues (basically employment).
Graphic 1.1. The EU2020S from the perspective of the SIESTA Project.
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However, it is important to stress from the outset that the mention of 
sustainability in the EU2020S has little to do with the general understand-
ing held of this concept. Indeed, the sustainable growth proposed by the 
EU2020S must be understood in a macro-economic sense, basically as growth 
must be “held up” in time and, therefore, degrowth, in which ample sectors 
of the Union have been immersed over the last five years, should be avoid-
ed. As stressed by Warleigh-Lack (2010: 307), “the language used in Europe 
2020 — ‘sustainable growth’ rather than ‘sustainable development’ — is not 
accidental. The former term does nothing to replace the idea that growth must 
be central to economic policy or to speak to the need for intergenerational 
solidarity. Responding to climate change is an afterthought, not the focus”. At 
this point, Anton and Gonzàlez Reverté (2005: 49) are relevant when affirm-
ing that “authentic contradiction is only given in the meaning of sustainable 
growth, based on the philosophy of continuous growth, while the concept of 
sustainable development is considered more congruent”. naredo (2007) has 
summarised it in an axiom “unsustainable growth, sustainable development”, 
which in practice denotes an inherent contradiction in the notion of sustaina-
ble growth.
In order to catalyse progress towards each one of priorities, seven flagship 
initiatives are put forward. These are key programmes or tools to foster the 
achievement of the EU2020S. These initiatives represent change inasmuch 
as they were absent in the development of the Lisbon Strategy. Legally, these 
have been resolved one by one through successive official communications in 
2010, except for one of them which was approved the following year (Europe-
an Commission, 2011a). The seven flagships are listed as follows:
- “Innovation Union” to improve framework conditions and access to 
finance for research and innovation so as to ensure that innovative 
ideas can be turned into products and services.
- “Youth on the move” to enhance the performance of education sys-
tems and to facilitate the entry of young people onto the labour mar-
ket.
- “A digital agenda for Europe” to speed up the roll-out of high-speed 
internet and reap the benefits of a digital single market.
- “Resource efficient Europe” to help decouple economic growth from 
the use of resources, support the shift towards a low carbon economy, 
increase the use of renewable energy sources, modernise the transport 
sector and promote energy efficiency.
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- “An industrial policy for the globalisation era” to improve the business 
environment, and to support the development of a strong industrial 
base able to compete globally.
- “An agenda for new skills and jobs” to modernise labour markets and 
empower people by developing their of skills throughout the lifecycle 
with a view to increase labour participation and better match labour 
supply and demand, including through labour mobility.
- “European platform against poverty” to ensure social and territori-
al cohesion the such that the benefits of growth and jobs are widely 
shared and people experiencing poverty and social exclusion are ena-
bled to live in dignity and take an active part in society.
Basically, the flagship initiatives are strategic programmes encouraged 
by the European Commission itself with its own leeway. These flagship initia-
tives are inter-related and are structured around the three reinforcing priorities 
(Graphic 1.1).
In terms of research developed in the SIESTA Project, regional and cohe-
sion policies have also been included in Graphic 1.1, despite not being expressly 
cited in the original EU2020S document. This is due to the fact the Commis-
sion itself has adopted two communications, on the same level as the seven al-
ready indicated, in which the achievement of the EU2020S objectives is sought 
through regional and cohesion policies; specifically related to smart growth (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2010c) and sustainable growth (2011b). The reason why a 
communication referring to inclusive growth has not been approved is unknown 
to us. The absence of a communication on this pillar is especially relevant to 
territorial effects because it comes precisely under the umbrella of inclusive 
growth that the EU2020S cites, although in a somewhat superficial way, as a ter-
ritorial question: “It is also essential that the benefits of economic growth spread 
to all parts of the Union, including its outermost regions, thus strengthening 
territorial cohesion” (European Commission, 2010a: 17). 
Also, the connection between regional and cohesion policies on the one 
hand, and the EU2020S on the other, has to do with the fact that the latest re-
ports on territorial cohesion drawn up by Commission — the fifth in the trien-
nial series (European Commission, 2010d) and seventh in a series evaluating 
the situation that is drafted every two years (European Commission, 2011c) — 
have also adopted the EU2020S as a reference for the application of a regional 
scale (Colomb and Santinha, 2012). At the same time, the Committee of the 
Regions has maintained a line of work on the EU2020S on a regional and local 
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scale that essentially seeks the exchange of “good practice” experiences or 
benchmarking in the implementation of strategy at these levels.3 
Likewise, the relevance of the EU2020S regarding the conformation of 
regional and cohesion policies in the 2014-2020 period is confirmed if doc-
uments currently under negotiation for that six year period are taken into ac-
count.4 In effect, the prime objective now on the table is the challenge for 
European regions to comply with the three priorities of the EU2020S; at the 
same time, the list of actions proposed for such aim replicate the directions set 
by their own emblematic initiatives that have just been reviewed.
In turn, the Territorial Agenda of the European Union, initially adopted in 
2007, was readapted in 2011 in order to also comply with the EU2020S. In re-
ality, the Territorial Agenda does not serve as an official document in the Un-
ion (something that the EU2020S or the different communications developed 
do comply with) and it is approved by informal ministerial meetings (Colomb 
and Santinha, 2012; Böhme et al., 2011). The keenness frequently incurred 
from academic areas to refer to the Territorial Agenda clashes with the scarce 
official significance of the same in the European area. Conversely, and despite 
the efforts carried out to draft a new Territorial Agenda after 2007 ― the now 
so-called Territorial Agenda 2020 ― and the work carried out by Böhme et 
al. (2011), the truth is that the coherency between the Territorial Agenda and 
the EU2020S constitutes a complex affair, if not to say impossible in many 
respects. For example, there does not seem to be any direct correspondence 
between territorial polycentrism (the first principle of the Territorial Agenda) 
and sustainable growth (as has been seen, one of the pillars of the EU2020S) 
(Böhme et al., 2011: 26).
All this shows the enormous relevance given to this strategic document in 
the decade of the conformation of European policy and, in particular, that of 
a territorial nature. Thus, the SIESTA Project has continually tried to accom-
plish a link between the EU2020S, on one hand, and regional and cohesion 
policies, on the other (Graphic 1.1).
2.3. Measuring Progress towards the EU2020S Achievement
Beyond priorities and flagship initiatives, the EU2020S consists of headline 
targets that are set for being achieved by 2020. In short, the EU2020S indicates 
3  See <http://portal.cor.europa.eu/europe2020/Profiles/Pages/welcome.aspx> (Accessed 22.1.2013).
4  See <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/proposals_2014_2020_en.cfm> (Accessed 
22.1.2013).
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the basic direction that the EU economy should follow and this direction is 
intended to be measurable by means of some indicators, that is, the headline 
targets. Again, these targets are supposed to be inter-related. It is important to 
stress that under the Lisbon Strategy defined quantifiable objectives were to 
be achieved by 2010; including some that have again been reiterated in the 
EU2020S, proving the non-compliance of the Strategy’s framework in the 
preceding decade. In the same way, and with a more optimistic tone, Çolak 
and Ege (2013: 661) have pointed out that the EU2020S indicators are more 
“realistic” than those of Lisbon. The official list of the EU2020S headlines is 
as follows:
- 75% of the 20-64 year-old population to be employed.
- 3% of the EU’s Gross Domestic Product to be invested in R&D.
- The three targets known as “20/20/20”: a 20% reduction (and even 
30% if possible) in greenhouse gas emissions in relation to 1990 lev-
els, 20% of energy from renewable sources and a 20% increase in 
energy efficiency.
- Reducing early school leavers to below 10%.
- At least 40% of 30-34 year-old population completing third level ed-
ucation.
- At least 20 million fewer people in or at-risk-of-poverty and social 
exclusion.
For the purpose of the SIESTA Project, all these objectives have been 
considered to be indicators to be mapped. In this way, the most relevant vari-
ables from a research point of view have been used at all times, in coherence 
with the official nature granted by the EU2020S. 
However, it must be stressed that the official EU2020S document itself 
complicates the strategy’s implementation of specific targets by recognizing 
that they can be modified by member states: “To ensure that each Member 
State tailors the Europe 2020 strategy to its particular situation, the Commis-
sion proposes that EU goals are translated into national targets and trajectories” 
(European Commission, 2010a: 5). Despite the commendable appearance of 
this phrase, in reality it weakens the EU2020S. In effect, the member states 
have had to systematically “downgrade” the EU goals. In this way, as has been 
shown by the SIESTA Project, the country by country sum does not guarantee 
that the global objectives set by the European Union can be achieved. In fact, 
the European Commission has already recognised, in a rather euphemistic 
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way, the lack of commitment from countries in the implementation of the 
EU2020S, in particular their headline targets. “The duration of the crisis has 
not helped Member States to press ahead with meeting their Europe 2020 
targets on employment, R&D, climate/energy, education and the fight against 
poverty, and overall Europe is lagging behind its objectives. Yet, progress in 
all of these areas is needed to move towards a smart, sustainable and inclusive 
European economy” (European Commission, 2012: 1).
It must be said that the accomplishment of these targets is being quite 
a controversial matter. not only at member state level, where indeed each 
country is establishing its own national headline target by adapting the general 
orientations of the EU, but also in the sense that each individual region is able 
(or it makes sense to do so) to achieve the national or the EU headline targets. 
This is not said in the EU2020S document itself, but in late 2011 the Com-
mission, by means of the Seventh Progress Report on Cohesion, has acknowl-
edged that it is not implicit that all the regions can or should reach the 2020 
targets, accepting that for some regions, the distance to the target is simply too 
great. The Commission has also added in this respect that for some issues it is 
not realistic or desirable that all regions reach the same target. “For example, 
R&D is highly concen trated in part due to benefits of clustering research. The 
concentration of poverty and exclusion, however, has a lot of negative effects” 
(European Commission, 2011c: 6).
The EU2020S is assessed each year through progress reports on the ful-
filment of the EU2020S, for the whole of the Union and for member states, 
which are officially called the Annual Growth Survey (to date, there are ver-
sions for 2011, 2012 and 2013 available). This survey is done in a consistent 
way following the EU2020S, and is supposed to be the framework on which 
the Annual Growth Survey is based. It typically consists of three annexes, as 
follows:
- Annex 1: Progress Report on Europe 2020. Importantly, this docu-
ment is reviewing the EU and national headline targets yearly.
- Annex 2: Macro-economic Report.
- Annex 3: Draft Joint Employment Report.
These reports link the tradition started with the Lisbon Strategy in annu-
ally assessing the progress made by each country on the Commission’s part — 
incidentally, with little fortune (Çolak and Ege, 2013; Moltó, 2012; Treidler, 
2011). Strikingly, the successive versions of the Annual Growth Survey seem 
to release contents directly related to the EU2020S. Indeed, surprisingly in the 
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2013 version the progress report on the EU2020S implementation has ceased, 
conversely, this had existed in the two previous years. This perhaps subtly 
indicates a distancing of the Commission in respect to its very own growth 
strategy. 
2.4. Concluding Remarks
After the research carried out by the SIESTA Project and in the framework 
of this brief text for an overall interpretation of the EU2020S, we believe that 
there is manifest evidence to show the frailty of the official Union growth 
strategy for the 2010-2020 period. We think that this frailty has nothing to do 
with either the three priorities identified by the EU2020S ― which are com-
mendable and probably suitable channels to strengthen the Union’s economy 
in times of crisis and, likewise, of increasing and challenging global competi-
tion ―, but with the design of the same tool. Indeed, the fiasco of the Lisbon 
Strategy has shown the need to develop a distinct type of document for the 
present decade, and to not reiterate its structural errors. However, this scenario 
has finally been the case. In this sense, Lundvall and Lorenz (2011) or Treidler 
(2011) had already anticipated that the EU2020S was doomed to failure be-
cause it largely suffered from the frailties of the Lisbon Strategy, starting from 
its non-binding nature. Farinós (2008), on analysing the Lisbon Strategy, also 
pointed to the absence of governance in its implementation as an important 
defect, something which undoubtedly repeats itself in the EU2020S.
On the other hand, we believe, as Erixon (2010) has argued, that focus-
ing on competences that are not the responsibilities of the Commission (ed-
ucation, poverty, etc.) detract legitimacy from the EU2020S. This also leads 
to the member states having to take charge of its development, something 
which ― through national objectives which systematically “downgrade” the 
European headline targets ― enormously biases the process. In this sense we 
share the views of Colomb and Santinha (2012) in that the “planning agenda” 
of the Union (EU2020S, Territorial Agenda, etc.) is weak in comparison to the 
macro-economy policy, this being clearly decisive. What is more, both con-
tradict each other constantly. In fact, at no time can it be said that the struggle 
against poverty or the investments in education are a real priority for the EU 
institutions ― not even for the member states in general ― but rather for the 
macro-economy, with persistent purposes such as austerity. In short, a strong-
er link to the EU2020S could be a suitable way to achieve smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth that has been envisaged for a decade that is currently 
immersed in an acute crisis. 
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